University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2013

Congress and its Other Budget Problem: An Examination of the
Effect of Campaign Contributions on Congress' Decision-Making
Joe Hollis Higdon

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Higdon, Joe Hollis, "Congress and its Other Budget Problem: An Examination of the Effect of Campaign
Contributions on Congress' Decision-Making" (2013). Honors Theses. 2349.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2349

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

CONGRESS AND ITS OTHER BUDGET PROBLEM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON CONGRESS' DECISION-MAKING

By
Joe Higdon

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College

Oxford
May 2013

Approved by

Dr. Jonathan Winbum

Reader: Dr. John M. Bmce

Reader: Dr. John >Winkle

©2013
Joe Higdon
n

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ABSTRACT

While there is significant study concerning the source of money in Congressional
campaigns, comparatively little is geared towards demonstrating the link between Congress’s
decision-making and the interests of the donors. By examining individual statements made
during the Congressional “Supercommittee” meetings and the overall voting behavior of the
Congress during specific debates, this paper finds that the link between donors’ interests and
members’ votes are varyingly correlated due to other factors, but in general the link is more
tenuous than is popularly believed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates
for special interests - including foreign companies - to spend without limit in our
elections.” These words are from President Barack Obama’s 2010 State of the Union
address and concern a recent Supreme Court ruling that altered the status quo largely
established by BCRA (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act). Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission has allowed corporations and unions to spend unlimited money on
election-related advertising, eliciting criticism from such varied sources as Barack
Obama,Sandra Day O’Connor,' and John McCain."

The criticism, as well as support for the ruling, has extended beyond that of the
standard politicos. Lawrence Lessig in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing on Citizens United wrote that this ruling could potentially increase the already
disparate gap in time between politicians’ fundraising and actual governance.'^ This
argument may have some weight. The perception is that politicians are beholden to those
with the funds, not those with the votes, causing Congress to spend time with moneyed
interests instead of constituents.

jLiptak 2010.
“ McCain, in fad, was co-sponsor of BCRA.
^ Lessig 2.
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There are, however, those who dispute this claim. Bradley Smith, writing for the
Wall Street Journal, argues that such talk is hyperbole, and that all the decision does is
allow independent entities (including corporations, unions, and even booksellers) to
express their political opinions."^ Whereas Lessig focuses on the idea of time shifting
away from governance and towards fundraising, Smith sees this as an issue of freedom
from the perspective of the private entity.

This has been the debate, going on for years, concerning money and its
relationship to politics. Most of the discussion on this issue, however, seems to focus on
how money affects the campaign, rather than the time spent in Washington.

This paper seeks to help rectify this situation. While election seasons are well
covered, what about the other times, where significant decisions are made? I want to
focus on the time politicians spend after winning the election and whether or not money
affects this. While it is certainly important to understand how money matters during the
campaign, it has been left unanswered as to whether, once politicians enter office, they let
campaign contributions impact their decision-making.

Therefore, this paper will seek to establish whether or not there is a definite and
pervasive link between campaign donations and Congressmen and Congresswomen s
voting behaviors. This is an enormous topic, with many ways of tackling this issue.
Entire books can be, and have been, written about the behavior of members of Congress,
and almost all of them have been longer than sixty pages. Nevertheless, every little bit of
illumination helps in an area which is very difficult to shed light on.

^ Smith 2010.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I will attempt to give a brief history
of campaign finance law. By examining this history and comparing it with contemporary
events in political history, one may perceive whether or not money has had an effect on
past politicians. It is also important to see how long politics has had a relationship with
money as well as the nature of that relationship. Then I will consider other causes of
voting behavior that should be kept in mind. It is always important to carefully consider
the potential for alternative explanations, and this study is no different. After this, I will
explain the methods used to examine national-level politicians, which includes elements
of both quantitative and qualitative study. Finally I will show the results of this study and
draw conclusions from this evidence.

From this paper I hope to show, to myself as well as others, whether or not the
issue of money in politics should be the national issue that it is today. Should Citizens
United worry the average American, or is it the case that an ease in contributing would, in
fact, be a boon to the democratic process? These are the questions that I hope to answer
in my study. It would be helpful, however, to begin by briefly covering the history of
campaign finance law in the United States.

The history of campaign funding reform is important because it provides context
for the current situation. In addition, it is able to teach us how such laws have been dealt
with (in most cases, circumvented) at various points in the past century. In order to
understand our current situation, one must look to the past to see how the system we have
today has been constructed.
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Campaign finance law first became a national issue at the turn of the 20^*^ century,
when progressivism became the norm and laws were enacted to limit the power of ‘big
business.’ Teddy Roosevelt, himself accused of corruption in the 1904 election, urged
Congress to pass the Tillman Act of 1907. The effects of the Tillman Act were limited.
There was exceedingly little enforcement, and loopholes were found almost instantly;
however this was the single most important campaign finance policy in the United States
for nearly seventy years. Other acts passed between this and FECA had little lasting
effect, in part due to the inadequate enforcement mechanisms and large loopholes found
in them.*^ The lasting legacy of this act was to ban direct corporate funding of elections.
This part of the Act remains to the present day and has not been challenged by any of the
recent court decisions concerning this issue.

In 1971, Congress decided to revisit campaign finance reform by passing the
Federal Election Campaign Act(or FECA). Rather than focus on contributors, FECA
attempted to limit the amount of money campaigns spent overall, with specific limits on
spending as well as requiring campaigns, both committees and candidates, to disclose
such financial information publicly. Remarkably, FECA also set up an opt-in system of
public finance wherein candidates could choose to receive public money equal to the
spending limit, provided he or she agree to not receive private funds. However, this has
not been adopted by any of the major national candidates since then and has largely been
forgotten. Moreover in 1974 the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo
overturned a large portion of the law. Spending limits on individuals as well as
campaigns were discarded, but kept the disclosure requirements found in the law.

^Corrado 2005, 29-31.
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Regardless of the Court’s decision, FECA greatly enlarged the government’s role in
regulating and overseeing the finances of public campaigns.^

The most recent step taken by Congress to reform campaign finance has been the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002(or BCRA). This act, otherwise known as
McCain-Feingold,stopped private entities from producing “electioneering
«7

communications. increased the breadth of the federal government’s role in limiting
campaign funding, and added more strict disclosure requirements for financial
Q

disbursements.

Very little of this matters today, however, because of the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In 2010,eight years after the
passing of BCRA,the Supreme Court ruled that limits on “electioneering
communications’’ are unconstitutional; moreover it found that any advertising, whether in
favor of a specific candidate or not, are protected by the First Amendment, assuming
there is no coordination between politicians and fundraisers. This would seem to fly in
the face of the principle of stare decisis, with the court disregarding the ruling found in
Buckley. However, those who celebrated the ruling considered it a boon for free speech.
Mitch McConnell, leader of the Senate’s Republicans and a foremost opponent of federal
10

intervention in campaigns, said the court “struck a blow for the First Amendment.

^ Corrado 2005, 33.
’’ This lerm is found in BCRA and meant to address broadcasts that are shown relatively prior to the
election (60 days for primaries and 30 days for general elections) and refers to a specific candidate
hlip://uw\v.fcL.»u>\/pat’cs/hrochuics/clcclionoerinti.slnnil
Citizens 2010.
Stohr 2010.
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The main point to take away from this history is that the power of the federal
government in this area has ebbed and flowed over time. What we typically see is
Congress passing a law that is amended or outright rejected by the judiciary soon after.
The aspects of the laws that do not get overturned are generally ignored or lack
mechanisms for enforcement. For instance, BCRA’s rule preventing coordination
between candidates and outside groups has been flagrantly violated on a number of
occasions. For instance, Ben Nelson has appeared in television advertisements funded by
the Democratic National Committee, a group which ostensibly counts as an outside
organization."Almost certainly in the future there will be another legislative attempt at
reducing private contributions, but whether it will accomplish that goal or not remains to
be seen.

Lightblau 201 1.
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Chapter 2: Why Study Contributions?
As has been said before, in the wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission special interests, whether it be corporations, unions, etc., can now spend a
nearly limitless amount of money supporting their candidates. But to what extent does
this effect members of Congress? Does a politician’s decision-making change just
because of who made donations to his or her campaigns?

There is no concrete evidence as of yet to support this claim. Of course one
logical assumption to make is that politicians, being concerned with re-election, placate
large donors in order to receive money which will keep them competitive in elections.
However, it could simply be that politicians are afraid of the potential power of interest
groups to move votes: one stark example is the case of the AMA (allegedly) deciding
elections in order to stop the drive for a national health insurance plan. “ This is not the
only side of the story, however: Ansolabehere et al. name five reasons why interest
groups give donations, each one assuming a response from the targeted politician. These
five reasons are 1) that donors assume a direct return on their investment, 2)that
donations are simply means by which donors earn access to politicians, 3)that donors
actually seek to affect the election’s outcome,4)that large donors are merely
aggregations of individual interests, overcoming what is essentially a collective action
problem, and 5)that the heads of large organizations enjoy “being part of the Washington
Mayhew 44.
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establishment," making access effectively a status symbol.'^ The first four are certainly
logical means by which donors’ contributions can affect a politician’s decision-making in
office, however without direct evidence there is little evidence to prove that such
strategies by donors actually succeed or not.

After all, there are a number of other variables confounding the situation. Any
conceivable variable could potentially affect Congressional voting patterns. In this
section I will consider, one by one, the most popular rationales for explaining voting
behavior that do not concern the financing of campaigns. These include differences in
.seniority, personal ideology, and the salience of issues for each Congressperson’s home
district.

Seniority is, among variables affecting politicians’ behavior, one of the easier
factors to measure. John Kingdon in his book Congressmen’s Voting Decisions argues
that seniority greatly affects voting patterns, mainly due to the influence and knowledge
that senior members bring. Junior members due to a lack of bargaining power and
direction tend to vote similarly to their more experienced colleagues, who in turn are
disposed to help them with more salient issues. Moreover the committee structure
reinforces this concept; senior members are given formal, in addition to informal,
14

power. The problem with this perspective is that it makes little attempt iofully explain
voting behavior. Seniority may explain voting behavior in cases where junior members
defer to senior members, but this situation cannot explain the voting behavior of senior
Ansolabehere el al. 2003, 126 - 127.
14

Kingdon 1968,91 -93.
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members and junior members without mentors. In addition,junior members’ motives for
deferring and senior members’ motives for giving advice would seem to be evidence for
other explanations. For instance, a junior member being rewarded for compliance with
agricultural subsidies for his state would be evidence for a cynical view of politicians
exclusively seeking re-election, rather than a legitimate respect for senior privilege.
Likewise, senior members using junior members to fit their own agenda would seem to
indicate a more ideological explanation for voting behavior. In either case, seniority by
itself cannot by itself constitute the most important factor in a politician’s decision¬
making.

Personal ideology is, for obvious reasons, a difficult variable to detect among
politicians. The importance of ideology to politicians’ decision making can vary

over

time, the Tea Party Republicans being the most recent example of an ideological faction
having a significant effect in Congress. The problem again is that this is not a pervasive,
constant force; as has already been mentioned, some members of Congress are more
ideologically stringent, or at least appear to be, than their colleagues. In addition, one
must keep in mind that ideology is most commonly subservient to achieving reelection.
The fact of the matter is that Congress is made up of professional politicians who must
achieve reelection in order to continue their careers, and that no matter how ideological a
member may be, reelection “has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must
be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained.’’*^

That leaves the salience of issues in (or ideology of) a Congressperson’s home
district. This fits in more with a ‘delegate’ model of representation and is congruent with

Kingdon 1968. 15-16.
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the idea expressed previously, which is that members of Congress seek reelection above
all else. The ideology of home districts is obviously an enormous factor in how
politicians make decisions; it is the main reason why conservative members come from
conservative districts and liberal members come from liberal districts. Yet this also does
not paint the entire picture. If a member of Congress can optimize his or her odds of
winning reelection by closely following the opinion of his or her home district, why does
party unity vary over time? While it has been observed that party leaders often tell their
members “that toeing the party line” is not as important as pleasing constituents,
members still commonly vote against the interests or desires of their own districts,
particularly when a vote is close or crucial.'^ One would expect that parties would
become virtually extinct (or at least incredibly ineffectual) if Congressmen and -women
slavishly followed the opinions of their districts. Therefore we can conclude that a home
district’s ideology is an important, but not surefire, way of determining the voting
behavior of Congress.

The commonly-known ‘models of representation’ that have been hinted at thus far
in the paper should be addressed. The models of representation theory asserts that
politicians behave one of three ways while in office: as a delegate, a trustee, or a politico.
Delegates are politicians that simply argue for what the majority of their constituents
want, regardless of their personal feelings about the matter. Trustees follow their own
beliefs, attempting to serve the public interest with their own attitudes and knowledge
rather than the opinion of the constituency. Lastly, politicos make decisions based on
whatever increases their chances of re-election. While they have a large role to play in

Herrnson 1995. 256.
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understanding how representation works, it is not enough to simply carve out three large
categories and place each representative in one of them. Besides being overly simple, it
may not even be an accurate representation of how politicians make decisions. As S.
Sydney Ulmer wrote in his book Political Decision-Making theorized on a variation of
the models of representation:

If these three role-defmitions [public-interest statesman, instructed
delegate, and ideologist] are viewed as models of how congressmen make
decisions they are hopelessly unrealistic. All three suffer from the same basic
flaw- they overestimate grossly the amount of information the congressman can
have at his disposal and his ability to process and evaluate this information before
voting. Congressmen must cast their votes on the basis of very little information; a
realistic model of congressional decision-making must be built on this inescapable
foundation.

Simply put, it may be entirely possible that representatives think largely counter to the
way the models of representation theorize, or may even be unable to judge information as
accurately as political scientists can.

One of the means by which to address how Congressmen vote in the face of little
information was proposed by Richard Fenno in his book Home Style. Fenno argues that
Congressmen, in order to be re-elected and further serve the public interest, attempt to
curry favor with four discrete constituencies: their geographic districts, constituents likely
to vote for them, their core group of supporters, and intimates (i.e. close friends, family.

Ulmer 1970, 21.
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and advisors). Members of Congress seek to curry favor with these various groups, but
will only seek to gain trust with the more distant groups if and only (fit does not reduce
influence with the more intimate constituencies. From this we can see that large donors,
falling into the categories of either core supporters or intimates depending on the
situation, would be more important to a Congressman than members of his geographic
constituency.

The implication from this is, then, that money (or access from money)largely
determines Congress's decisions, with contributions being seen as the way to remain
competitive in elections. This paper will examine that theory by taking two approaches:
one is the examination of Congress as a whole, looking at larger movements in terms of
monetary flow versus measures taken by Congress, both Republican and Democratic.
The second is to examine politicians at the individual level, taking into account their
preferences and comparing them to the flow of money to their campaigns.

There is a legitimate criticism of this structure to be made, namely, that it would
be simpler to cover one of these two aspects here and now, rather than try to divide time
and effort between them. There are, however, problems with using these individual forms
of analysis alone.

Using the quantitative method alone brings some problems to the fore, mainly that
painting Congressional behavior with such broad strokes would confound the already
well-hidden traces of causality in members’ decisions. Examining Congress as a whole,
with money going in on one side and legislation coming out on the other, obfuscates the

Aldrich el al. I.
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issue and cannot be used to decisively deduct the effects of money on politics. One could
very well argue from this method alone that the causality is reversed, in other words that
contributions are determined by the decisions made by members.

Moreover, as has already been said, there are other factors, such as seniority,
which must be examined before making a conclusion, and quantitative analysis alone
cannot handle them. By looking at individual members one can compare their behaviors,
drawing conclusions based on their histories and differences. For instance, if forty
Senators were to receive a large amount of support in the form of contributions from the
AARP and subsequently pass legislation favorable to that interest group, one would
reasonably conclude that the AARP’s lobbying contributed to that particular piece of
legislation. However, more careful analysis could very well show that the members who
voted to pass the legislation received no contributions, voting instead due to constituents’
demographics, and all of the money instead went to politicians who eventually voted no
on the matter.

From this one can see why a quantitative study alone would not satisfy a search
for causation in Congressional voting behaviors. We must also look at individual
members to draw any sort of real information from the matter. Therefore, in addition to
the floor votes of the House of Representatives, it is important to take a closer look and
look at a smaller subject: in this case, the subject will be the Joint Select Committee on
Deficit Reduction, also known as the “Supercommittee.”

14

Chapter 3: The Supercommittee and its Processes
The Supercommittee was formed by Congress’ 2011 Budget Control Act in order
to solve the 2011 debt ceiling crisis. As a joint select committee, it took the form of a
bicameral body, containing members of both the House of Representatives and the
United States Senate in equal numbers. In addition, both political parties were
represented in equal numbers. House Speaker John Boehner chose Reps. John Hensarling
(Co-Chair) of Texas, Fred Upton of Michigan, and Dave Camp of Michigan. House
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi chose Reps. Xavier Becerra of California, Jim Clybum of
South Carolina, and Chris van Hollen of Maryland. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
picked Senators Patty Murray (Co-Chair) of Washington, Max Baucus of Montana, and
John Kerry of Massachusetts, while Minority Leader Mitch McConnell picked Senators
John Kyi of Arizona, Rob Portman of Ohio, and Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania. It is
difficult to argue that this selection is not diverse in terms of partisanship and home
districts.

One should take a moment to notice the diversity of seniority to be found in this
Supercommittee. For the purposes of simplification it is easier to form three categories of
descending seniority. The oldest group, consisting of Max Baucus, Fred Upton, John
Kerry, and Jon Kyi had all begun their services between the years of 1975 and 1987. The
‘middle’ group consists of Patty Murray, Rob Portman, Xavier Becerra, Jim Clyburn, and
Korle 2011.
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Dave Camp. This group began service between 1991 and 1993. Finally, the youngest
group is made up of Jeb Hensarling, Pat Toomey, and Chris van Hollen who have served
since 1999-2003. Because it is difficult to control for all other possible variables, it would
serve better to choose one relationship and see if it applies moreso than campaign
contributions. In this case, we will be looking at seniority as a comparison. Seniority
seems to be the most prevalent and important differentiating variable among the members
surveyed here, except of course for party and ideology.

The methodology used in this section is simple; by listening to the committee
members’ statements made and questions asked during the public testimonies (private
negotiations are unavailable due to being closed-door sessions), one can get an idea of the
members’ ways of thinking and their positions on the various issues that the committee
discussed. Once this is done, by looking at the member’s list of recently received
donations it can be roughly determined whether those views are in line with the
individual member’s largest donors. If there is alignment, and there is reason to suspect
that those views are not in line with what the constituents in the member s district would
support, then 1 believe that that is sufficient grounds to conclude that campaign money
has significantly affected the decisions made by that member.

However, this is not a completely solid connection. One should remember while
reading that committee testimony is not the definitive telling of a politician’s desires;
moreover. what is announced in public may be the complete opposite of what is said in
private. It is certainly possible that these committee members act a certain way in the
public testimonies in order to posture for donors or voters. This, obviously, is impossible
to measure, mainly because politicians make a point to keep private conversations off the
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record. However, in this case such a difference between private and public discussions
may be irrelevant. Whether or not members are posturing matters little, as the statements
at these hearings are still indicative of how the politician wants to appear to the general
public (the public in this case being both constituents and donors, big and small).
Therefore, while the statements made may be more bombastic than sentiment, it still
provides a fairly accurate picture of how a politician wishes to be viewed by those not
privy to the private discussions. By focusing on individual members of Congress one can
better determine what is posturing and what is genuine.

Probably the most outspoken member of this Committee in terms of ideology was
Jeb Hensarling, both the Republican Co-Chair and one of its youngest members.
Hensarling was likely the most opinionated of the voices at the Committee hearings, with
one of the lines of his opening statement at the first hearing being “This committee must
be primarily about the business of saving and reforming social safety net programs that
„20

are not only failing many beneficiaries but are going broke at the same time,

Keep in

mind that this statement was given before any testimony from experts had been heard.
Moreover, Hensarling made it no secret that his ideas were from prominent individuals in
the business community, quoting a number of CEO’s of prominent companies.

Bernie Marcus, chairman and CEO of Home Depot, which employs 255,000: ‘If
we continue this kind of policy we’re dead in the water. If we don’t lower
spending and if we don’t deal with paying down the debt we are going to have to
raise taxes. Even brain-dead economists understand that when you raise taxes you

20

Full videos of the Supercommittee hearings can be found in C-Span's archive at hup://\vvvw.cspun\ itlct).(>1 g/u)piL/K5
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cost jobs.' Mike Jackson, CEO of Auto Nation, 19,000 employees: ‘the best thing
this town could do to help this economic recovery become sustainable is to deal
with the deficit and to see tax reform.' Jay Fishman, chairman and CEO of
Travelers' Insurance Company: ‘what's really weighing on their minds is not
knowing how the coming explosion in federal debt is going to affect their
9^9

borrowing costs, liquidity, cost of doing business, and prices.

Clearly Hensarling had in mind when discussing the deficit was the effect that it would
have on domestic business practice. However, there is little to suggest that those
businesses have any significant financial ties to Hensarling’s Congressional campaigns.
These three businesses were not significant fmancers of Hensarling’s when compared to
21

Other businesses."

And yet the questions and comments from the Texas Congressman gave the
distinct impression that he was in favor of a tax code favoring large businesses over small
businesses or individuals. This is not surprising from a funding perspective, as the
primary funders of Hensarling's 2011 -2012 campaigns are large financial institutions,
with IBC Bank, Cash America International, and Ernst & Young being the top three
overall contributors.

However, this can easily be explained by the fact that Hensarling is a Republican
Congressman from Texas, and may have ideological rather than professional reasons for
favoring businesses over individuals. Without direct evidence that Hensarling’s
comments are in support of the specific institutions that donated money to his campaign.
Meaning that these businesses were not in the top twenty financiers for Hensarling’s 2011-2012
campaign cycle. Financial information for individual Representatives' campaigns can be found at
(IjX’nScL I cls.oig.
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the conclusion must be that election contributions had little effect on his behavior during
the Supercommittee hearings.

The other co-chair of the committee was Patty Murray, the Senator from
Washington. Her opening remarks on the first day of hearings were somewhat more
optimistic than her co-chair, stating that she hoped “we can continue to not allow
ourselves to not be boxed in or pigeon-holed by special interest groups, or partisans, or
media, or pundits, and we are allowed the room to come to a balanced agreement.” Her
comments were primarily geared towards reducing tax rates for individuals and smaller
businesses as opposed to larger ones, noting - again in the first hearing - that she “hear[s]
from businesses that are struggling - especially small businesses - that are having a tough
time creating the jobs that millions of Americans are desperate to fill.”

But what did Sen. Murray mean when she said “a balanced agreement”? Perhaps
the most enlightening statements come from the Sept. 22 hearing when she noted that

Last week CBO [Congressional Budget Office] director Elmendorf testified that
the CBO had considered several various tax proposals and weighed their
effectiveness in stimulating the economy. He mentioned reductions in the payroll
tax as among the most powerful, followed by expensing of investment cost for
businesses and followed by that, by just a little bit, broader reductions in income
taxes.

In recalling Elmendorfs testimony on the effects of various economic actions, Murray is
implicitly admitted that she agreed with his assessment. The question, then, is whether or

19

not these statements are directly correlated to the interests of her largest financial
supporters.

There is somewhat similar evidence suggesting that Sen. Murray, in comparison
to Rep. Hensarling, may or may not be influenced by campaign contributions. While the
top contributors from 2007 - 2012(the top three, for reference, being EMDLY’s List,
Microsoft, and the University of Washington) do not have a particular interest in the
viewpoint that Sen. Murray is expressing, when looking at the top industries there arises a
somewhat different picture. The number one source of contributions for Murray’s
campaign comes from lawyers and law firms. This is not surprising, as Democratic
candidates are commonly given large sums by law firms. However,taken with the second
largest contribution source, the retired, this paints a different picture. By choosing to
focus on lowering taxes for the individual rather than the business. Sen. Murray may be
attempting to shift the focus from entitlement reform (affecting primarily the
beneficiaries of Medicare and Social Security, in other words the elderly) to tax reform.
Senator Murray may have been influenced by such organizations as the AARP in her
decision-making; however, yet again there is no hard evidence to suggest that such
influence exists. The largest differences between Sen. Murray’s and Rep. Hensarling’s
styles of thinking can be attributed more to Hensarling’s ideological focus as opposed to
Murray’s focus on catering to key constituents such as the elderly.

These differences between the more ideological and more technocratic
approaches can be more clearly seen when comparing two other members of the deficit
committee, Sens. Pat Toomey and John Kerry. The Republican Congressman from
Pennsylvania seemed starkly opposed to raising taxes and strongly in favor of across-the-
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board tax reform. In his opening statement Toomey addressed the need to foster
economic growth in saying:

How do we do that [foster economic growth]? Well, one I would observe that
cutting spending and reducing the deficit is itself pro-growth, because it removes
the chilling effect that excessive deficits have on job creators and investment. But
the other big opportunity for us is tax reform. You know,a simpler, fairer system
that has lower marginal rates would encourage economic growth and go a long
way to helping this problem.

Toomey here is making clear his stance, which is that lowering marginal tax rates (i.e.
taxes on higher incomes) would increase economic growth and therefore increase the
amount of total revenue for the government. However, he also addressed the more
specific parts of tax policy that he took issue with:

I mean, examples abound. We have ethanol credits that are bad economic, bad
agriculture, bad tax policy. We use a tax code to force Americans to pay more for
inefficient sources of electricity. That costs us Jobs, and when huge iconic
American corporations can pay little or no income taxes, well that’s just
indefensible. So I think we ought to wipe out those special-interest favors and
have commensurately lower rates and encourage the economic growth that will
generate more revenue, generate more jobs.

These quotes illustrate a definitive ideological stance towards reducing tax rates, but
more importantly towards eliminating tax credits that favor what Toomey calls “specialinterest favors.”

21

In comparing these statements with Toomey’s campaign records, it becomes clear
that both financial industries and consen'ative political action groups desire influence
over the Congressman. The most important of Toomey’s contributors, by far, is Club for
Growth, a political action group that exclusively funds conservatives, typically
Republicans."" The rest of Toomey's top five contributors, except for one (the Senate
Conservatives Fund) are financial businesses. Whether or not these businesses would
desire all of Toomey's ideas are irrelevant; what is key here is that Toomey is attempting
to address the need to cater to the large financial industries as well as his more
conservative base. Campaign contributions may have had some effect on Toomey’s
tenure as a Pennsylvania Senator, however his statements may simply be due to the fact
that Toomey is very ideologically conservative; any large donations from outside sources
may be a side effect.

Compare this with John Kerry's statements and financial records. Much like
Toomey, Kerry received large donations from financial services industries, among them
Bain Capital and Blackstone. However, Kerry himself said little during the actual
hearings, preferring instead to defer to his colleagues. What he did say was essentially
technocratic in nature, recalling the Gramm-Rudman Act in the 1980’s and the balancing
of the budget in the 1990’s, both done with Democratic and Republican support. Kerry
stressed his willingness to cooperate and incorporate Republican ideas in the committee’s
final recommendation as well.

“■ Club lor Growth accounts lor $850,041 of Pat Toomey’s $20,472,488 campaign dollars raised from 2007
-2012.
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If Kerry was catering in any way to the financial institutions that paid for his
campaign, he hid it remarkably well. There was essentially no statement of real substance
in his remarks at the hearings. Instead he chose to often remind his colleagues that an
agreement between both Republicans and Democrats would be necessary to come to a
successful result. Perhaps he was aiming for more of an ‘elder statesman’ role, choosing
to help guide the younger members of the committee and contain their ideological
enthusiasm. Or perhaps he was a lion in the closed-doors debates of the committee,
choosing to appear bipartisan and reasonable to the public. Whatever the case, we cannot
know, for Kerry made no indication during the hearings that he was supporting or
opposing measures concerning his most powerful donors.

One may have noticed at this point that the two younger members examined thus
far, Jeb Hensarling and Pat Toomey, have been described in this paper as a bit more
ideologically stringent than their counterparts, and the older members, illustrated here by
the cases of Patty Murray and John Kerry, are more pragmatic in their approach towards
government. This pattern will manifest itself in further iterations in this approach,
however, as will be shown this is not a perfectly predictive method for determining a
member’s decision-making process.

The next Congressman to be examined is one Xavier Becerra, one of California’s
many Democratic Representatives. Becerra was one of the more aggressive questioners
during the testimonies, remarking on the first day that “they [the American people] have
been telling us time and time again ... to treat everyone on the team fairly, not favoring
special interests, as we look to spread the pain and the gain.’’ Becerra as a liberal
Democrat was clearly seeking here to ensure that corporations and other large financial
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bodies pay more taxes than they did at the time, and more importantly to make known his
position to the public. He continued on October 26 during questioning to attack the
current system of allocating tax expenditures, concluding a line of questioning with “so
we spend almost as much through the tax code for certain constituencies as we spend
through the entire appropriations and allocations process, through the regular budgetary
process. That's the type of spending we're not talking about today, the tax expenditures.
Becerra is arguing that the focus of the committee should be to look at groups that profit
from tax loopholes and other forms of selective tax expenditures, and see if some of the
deficit can be lessened by addressing that part of the budget.

Becerra’s statements are strongly in line with the interests held by most of his
major donors. The vast majority of his large donors are unions such as the American
Association for Justice, the American Federation of Teachers, and the Operating
Engineers Union, each giving the $5,000 a year limit to standard PAC donations. Each of
these groups would rather see tax expenditures, particularly those favoring larger
businesses, be eliminated rather than see tax increases on the individual or a reduction in
entitlement spending.

Despite having received a significant amount of money from the financial
industry and other large donations from businesses, the vast majority of Becerra’s
contributions come from union organizations. Over the course of the Supercommittee’s
short life Becerra fervently fought for the interests of those groups over the interests of
various businesses. Therefore it is safe to say that Becerra is more likely, especially when
compared to his colleagues reviewed thus far, to be influenced by campaign contributions
than not.
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When looking at seniority, a good comparison to make to Becerra’s history is that
of Senator Rob Portman. A former Representative and now Senator of Ohio, Sen.
Portman is used to running in a fairly competitive state. Indeed his proposals were fairly
moderate and uncontroversial, if business-friendly, saying that “we should aim to do
what’s necessary to bring long-term sustainability to the federal budget. The American
people want this, the financial markets, the credit agencies are looking for this, and future
generations, who will be inheriting the debt, will need this.” He also echoed Toomey’s
support of tax reform, believing that

We should try to fix our complex anti-growth tax code. Common sense tax
reforms can eliminate unjustified tax preferences, apply those savings to lower,
more competitive tax rates to encourage savings, investment, and Jobs. That’ll
create economic growth and generate more revenue.

These statements betray a fairly pro-business attitude. Portman’s support of a tax
structure that encourages investment would again benefit the financial industries rather
than directly help the individuals in his district. Moreover, one would expect, if accusing
Portman of representing his donors rather than his constituents, that Portman’s list of
contributors would include the financial firms who participate in the markets that he
mentioned. And indeed that is the case, with his list of top contributors being filled to the
brim with large financial corporations. Five out of his top ten donors(American Financial
Group, Elliott Management, Ernst & Young, JPMorgan Chase, and FMR Corporation)
are financial industry firms.
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It is easy to say from this observation that Rob Portman is more than likely
keeping his larger donators in mind rather than the average constituent’s. One would
assume that a Senator would have no business to do with industries that operate almost
exclusively in areas outside of his or her own state, but companies like Elliott and
JPMorgan do just that, being headquartered in New York City. Portman, then, could not
possibly be operating on the interests of his own district, but rather be a voice for the
groups that give him money so that he can stay in Washington. Rob Portman is certainly
an example of a politician who is almost entirely captured by financial interests outside of
his own district.

Both of these two Congressmen, Xavier Becerra and Rob Portman, definitely do
not agree on much. Becerra, being a Democrat from California, is predictably quite
liberal, and Portman, though not from a Republican stronghold is fairly conservative in
his own right. These men alone can rule out the possibility that party or ideology
determines the influence of money. Both have views that are in line with their donors,
and are more than likely representing those interests over their own constituents.

These men also share another thing in common: they arrived in Congress at
around the same time. Becerra and Portman both began service in the early 1990’s,
earning a ‘middle-ground’ designation of seniority in this paper. It may very well be that
susceptibility to donators’ interests varies over time, with Congressmen, after having
served a number of years, become less concerned with ideology and more concerned with
representing lobbyists’ interests. For the sake of looking at the differences between newer
and older Congressmen and -women, it would be beneficial to next compare a new
Congressman with an older one, in this case Max Baucus and Chris Van Hollen.
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Max Baucus was the longest-serving member of Congress on the
Supercommittee, having been a national-level legislator since 1975. It was natural, then,
for Baucus to assume the time-honored role of elder statesmen to the other members
present. Noting a number of times that the work of the committee would be difficult,
Baucus commonly reminded his colleagues that compromise would be necessary for the
committee to reach a meaningful conclusion and took a rather moderate tone for most of
the proceedings. However, it was also clear that Sen. Baucus wanted to ensure that the
committee was not misled by any of its own members or the experts called to testify. In a
question-and-answer session with Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, Baucus pressed him concerning an assumption made by a
number of Republican members present:

It is true, as has been mentioned here already today, that the 50% of small
business income is subject to the top two rates, but it is not true that 50% of small
businesses, employers, are subject to the top two rates, in fact only three percent
are. And it's also true, isn’t it Mr. Barthold, that only 3% of business income are
subject to the top two rates? [...] And in addition, isn’t it tme that about half of
the 3% of tax-payers are bankers or celebrities that earn large salaries and don’t
employ really anybody but really invest a small portion of their income in
publicly traded pass-throughs, is that correct?

It would seem that Baucus, rather than attempting to cater to any particular interest, was
interested in getting accurate information from the testimonials. This indicates a
technocratic approach on the part of the Montana Senator rather than an ideological one.
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Max Baucus' recent campaign financial records as a Senator are particularly
difficult to analyze, as he is a member of three Senatorial committees (Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, Environment and Public Works, and Finance), and as such
receives contributions from a large variety of donors, particularly those involved in the
health industry. However, it is safe to say that Baucus relies little on donations from
unions, relying instead on large businesses for contributions. Businesses such as Aetna
and Goldman Sachs are crucial to Baucus' fundraising. It is surprising, then, to see
Baucus essentially cheerlead an effort to increase tax rates for the top two tax brackets.

One could look at this and see a confident Baucus, who has been re-elected
numerous times, simply not worried about his funding and his chances for re-election.
However, there are scholars that would strongly contend that characterization, such as
John Kingdon, who in his book Candidatesfor Office observes that:

One of the dominant impressions of my travels is the terrific sense of uncertainty
which animates these congressmen. They perceive electoral troubles where the
most imaginative outside observer could not possibly perceive, conjure up or
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hallucinate them."

Congressmen, according to Kingdon, are constantly paranoid about electoral chances,
attempting to over-ensure reelection at every possible opportunity.

This leaves the option that Baucus actually believes that the road to re-election is
not through the more corporate-friendly policies of ideological conservatism, but through
presenting himself as a truly center-left politician who would rather raise taxes on the top
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two brackets than cut entitlements and lower taxes for businesses. This is fairly
counterintuitive; there is a common conception in America that the eldest statesmen are
typically the most corrupt, having lived in Washington for an extended period of time.
However, it may be untrue. The two longest-serving members shown so far have been
fairly indifferent to pleasing contributors, at least when compared to other members of
the committee.

The last committee member to be closely looked at here is Chris Van Hollen. Van
Hollen is a Democratic Representative from Maryland, having served since 2003. This
makes him equal in time to Jeb Hensarling, the Republican co-chair highlighted earlier.
This would make him the third of the three extremely new members of Congress on the
committee, along with Hensarling and Pat Toomey. Van Hollen really only made one
declarative statement over the course of the hearings; however, it was very indicative of
his way of thinking. Van Hollen noted that “the biggest obstacle to economic growth
right now is weak consumer demand. It's simple. Businesses are not going to hire
employees unless they have consumers for their goods and services.”

One certainly would not call Van Hollen a student of supply-side economics from
this statement. Moreover it indicates that Van Hollen’s way to renew economic growth is
not through reducing tax rates for businesses, but increasing the amount of money
available to the individual consumer, presumably through tax breaks for lower income
brackets. If Van Hollen makes decisions based on moneyed interests, then, the primary
donors would be non-business PACs and (presumably, since Van Hollen is a Democrat)
law firms.
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And indeed that is the case; large donations to Chris Van Hollen almost
exclusively consist $10,000 donations from law firms such as Arnold & Porter and Arent
Fox LLP, and unions such as the American Association for Justice and the National
Education Association. Seeing as Van Hollen seemed to strongly push for a tax code that
favors individuals over businesses in his statements, this is not surprising for one that
hopes to see a financial connection.

Moreover, Van Hollen's constituency would favor such policies, being from a
fairly liberal (Maryland's S'*") district. While the majority of Van Hollen’s money comes
from liberal interests. Van Hollen sees little conflict coming from voters. This may
enable him to fully align himself with the groups that donate to his campaign.

However, Van Hollen's constituency contains a number of large businesses which
would probably rather see a far more business-friendly tax code. Bethesda, a city in Van
Hollen’s district, is a famously wealthy area, housing headquarters for such companies as
Lockheed Martin and, until recently, Bethesda Softworks. Van Hollen, then, is catering to
the more consumer-friendly interests inside of his district rather than businesses. He is,
ironically, a liberal Democrat that opposes big business representing some of the biggest
businesses in the country.

As has previously been mentioned, the majority of Van Hollen’s large donations
come from individuals subject to the $10,000 spending limit. These groups are divided
between law firms and unions, though there are a few corporations (notably Lockheed
Martin) that contribute.
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Van Hollen may be the best example here of a Democrat driven by union
donations. However, these interests are not in conflict with the interests of his general
constituency. Surrounded by liberal donors as well as liberal voters, Van Hollen has a
clear path to reelection, that is, by being as liberal and pro-consumer as possible.

All of this information, accumulated from the Supercommittee hearings and the
Congressmen's own histories, paints a confusing picture. A rather counterintuitive
correlation seems to exist between seniority and agreement with large donors. The elder
statesmen such as John Kerry and Max Baucus (both Fred Upton and Jon Kyi seemed
conspicuously silent during the hearings) have views that are less in line with the views
held by their largest donors, or at least did not expressly cater to their interests. Both were
fairly technocratic, asking testifiers such as Douglas Elmendorf questions that did not
contain a partisan or ideological slant so much as betray an actual desire for accurate
information. This is in contrast to the other questioners, who asked questions with the
clear intent of forcing the testifiers into making a specific statement, such as that the
military accounts for a very large portion of the budget or that current Medicare growth is
unsustainable.

The other two categories of experience were more of a mixed bag and not nearly
as clear in their results. There was a strong divide between more ideological
Congressmen such as Hensarling or Becerra and members interested in large financial
contributors such Portman. One may gleam a small relationship in that the youngest
members tended toward the ideological side and the older members were interested in
donations, but this is minor, with exceptions to the rule found on both sides.
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Importantly, age did not function as a decider of ideology or decision-making, but
rather a facilitator to the intluence of money on decision-making. Members of the same
age group like John Kerry and Max Baucus were certainly not in agreement with each
other, much less with the elder Republican colleagues. Rather their relationship with
donors was strikingly similar, that is, there was a marked disregard to large donors found
QQjY^jYionly between them. There was no such correlation to be found in the other two age
groups.

Why is this the ca.se? 1 believe the answer lies in the simple fact that these
veterans have won more consecutive elections than their comrades. These men maybe
more confident in their abilities to win re-election than others, giving them more freedom
to behave in a way that seems comfortable to them rather than their constituents. This
seems to run counter to Kingdon's observation that Congressmen are perpetually
uncertain about their own election and re-election chances and seek to win every possible
piece of leverage that would help them win. There are, of course, exceptions to every
rule, but it may simply be the case that more senior members have established
connections with guaranteed sources of money, regardless of a few comments at a
committee hearing.

One alternative explanation is that these members care less about their electoral
chances than newer and younger members. Baucus is now 71 years old and a Senator
(therefore seeking re-election only every 6 years); Kerry is now 69 and will almost
certainly not run in an election for the foreseeable future, having been chosen as
President Obama’s Secretary of State. Members that are this elderly are most likely
already considering retirement and would not be particularly distraught if they lost their
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next election. This explanation can peaceably coexist with Kingdon’s writings and David
Mayhew's, who argued in his book Congress: The Electoral Connection that Congress in
modern times is “an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers”
and that in order to achieve a lifetime career politicians seek to ensure continual re24

election.

Another important observation to make is that the majority of those influenced by
donations are primarily interested in money from corporate sources rather than union
ones. This is no surprise when looking at the overall numbers of Congress; the Center for
Responsive Politics notes that businesses are larger donors than labor interests by a 15:1
margin."'*' Likewise, the only members who had significant and influential donations on
this committee were Reps. Xavier Becerra and Chris Van Hollen. All other members’
most important donators were of related to business interests.

That is not to say that these labor interests are not effective in the money that they
do put out; Becerra and Van Hollen are two of the Supercommittee members that are
most noticeably in line with the interests of their largest donors. However, business
interests still dominate; no one in the hearings quoted labor leaders or even leaders of
ideological interests; on the other hand, as has been noted previously, the interests of
CEOs(such as Bernie Marcus) and other business leaders, small businesses or otherwise.
were prominently in focus.

The Supercommittee is an important moment in the culture of American politics,
and is a significant subject of this paper because it is a microcosm of the attitudes of
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individual members of Congress as well as the relationships between themselves and
outside interests. However, these are only twelve people. In order to gleam more of a
perspective on how Congress operates and treats moneyed interests, one must look at
Congress as a whole, looking at broader strokes of data and history. Only then can one
decisively deduct whether or not money is an important factor in the operations of
Congress and its individual members.
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Chapter 4: The Behavior of Congress
Looking at individual members of Congress is all well and good, but it is still
important to look at Congress as a whole, especially in the light of the information
provided by the Supercommittee's hearings. As has been mentioned previously, in order
to understand how the Supercommittee fits in with how Congress operates overall one
needs to look at the inflow and outflow of money and votes and compare that with the
ways that the Supercommittee members operated individually.

The most obvious dynamic at play when considering the sources of money
donated to members is that of business vs. labor. In American politics the usual story is
that businesses give donations primarily to Republicans and labor groups donate to
Democrats. The evidence, generally, bears this out, with Republicans receiving 59% of
contributions from businesses and Democrats receiving 91% of contributions from labor
groups."^ This is not the only discrepancy in the numbers: in 2012 business contributions
totaled around fifteen times the amount of contributions from labor. In order for the
hypothesis that contributions affect politicians’ decision-making to hold true, it would
mean that the Republican Party taken as a whole would support business interests nearly
100% of the time and the Democratic Party would also support business interests most of
the time, but on issues particularly salient to labor would take stances in their support.
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Overall this implies that Congress (particularly in divided sessions) should favor
business interests rather than labor interests on economic issues. Both parties receive the
majority of their contributions from corporations and the voting history of Congress
should reflect that.

Take, for instance, the issue of raising the minimum wage, proposed by President
Obama in his 2013 State of the Union address as a way to increase the income of some of
America's lowest-earning workers. Politically speaking, this move has been criticized by
prominent members of the Republican Party. According to some,including Tom Curry, a
writer for NBC News, Republicans are typically against increases in the minimum wage,
arguing that minimum wage increases would cause a large number of layoffs in order to
pay for increased salaries."^ Perhaps more importantly, this is also the argument used by a
large number of business owners and corporate interests. The same article mentioned
previously quotes a David Rutigliano, a partner in a chain of Connecticut restaurants and
members of the Connecticut Restaurant Association, arguing that minimum wage
increases would “only hurt those employees which this proposal[Tom Harken’s proposal
to raise the minimum wage to $10.10] seeks to help.

This runs counter to the desires of the general public, who overwhelmingly
support an increase of the minimum wage. A recent Gallup poll shows that an
overwhelming 71% of American adults favor raising the minimum wage to at least $9.00
an hour; even self-declared Republicans and Conservatives are narrowly in support of a
28

wage hike.
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In addition there is a strong history of the public supporting minimum wage
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increases over time, and Congress has generally acceded to these numbers. So then we
can see from the unlikelihood of a minimum wage increase a tendency from the current
Congress to oppose a policy in favor of businesses even if this policy is seen as desirable
by the vast majority of the American public.

What this also shows, besides a general lack in the current Congress’ ability to do
something amenable to the public, is an actual change in the dynamics of Congress over
time. Previous wage increases have been fairly popular and have passed with little
controversy, with the last wage increase as of March 2013 being signed by none other
than George W. Bush in 2007.“*^ This may have something to do with the Citizens United
decision, as the timeline would seem to indicate that a minimum wage increase has only
become controversial since between 2007 and now (increases in the minimum wage were
fairly uncontroversial until after the Supreme Court decision). It seems logical to
conclude from this that Citizens United and the subsequent increase in donation funding
has at least in part increased the willingness of Congressional Republicans to oppose
measures hurting businesses. However, it may also simply be that the recession, coupled
with the rise of a more conservative House membership (i.e. the members of the so-called
Tea Party caucus), has caused House and Senate Republicans to sour on the idea of any
‘anti-business’ policy. Nevertheless, Republicans have been firm on the issue, voting
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unanimously in the House to reject any increase in the minimum wage.

On the other side of the aisle, Congressional Democrats have been lukewarm on
the idea of raising the minimum wage. While the Senate has not had the opportunity to
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vote on a bill, the House has, and the Democrats did not find the same firm unanimity as
the other party did. Six^' House Democrats voted with Republicans to strike down the
measure increasing wages to $10.10, voting in opposition to the 184 Democrats who
supported the amendment.

These Democratic voting numbers show a marked difference to the more pro
business attitude of the House Republicans. As has been previously mentioned, the
institutions donating to the Democratic Party imply that, for an amendment such as this,
one would expect the majority of Democrats to oppose this measure due to most of their
support coming from business leaders. However, this is not at all what happened; rather
the vast majority of Democrats supported this amendment. Assuming the hypothesis held
true. Democrats would have opposed the amendment roughly in proportion to the amount
of money that is from corporate and business sources.

There are, of course, other explanations that allow for this hypothesis to coexist
with this voting record. For instance, it is entirely possible that the Democratic
leadership, knowing that the amendment raising the minimum wage would fail regardless
of their own votes, chose instead to signal a pro-consumer stance while privately assuring
business donors that, had their votes actually mattered, they would oppose the measure.
However, this narrative, while plausible, is not provable without private information, and
thus cannot be taken as fact here.

From the minimum wage debate one can see that it is certainly difficult to prove a
relationship between donors and votes. Moreover, this example further shows that while
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money may explain some voles, it cannot explain others. It would seem that House
Republicans in this case ‘followed the money' by unanimously opposing measures that (it
is believed) w'ould hurt the business community. Whether donations were the sole reason
for this is indecipherable, but it can certainly be seen from the donor history that this at
least contributed to the Republicans' steadfastness on the issue. Democrats,on the other
hand, were more malleable in this regard. Their pro-consumer vote record here stands in
contrast to the Democratic Party's donor history, which shows the vast majority of their
donations coming from businesses. It may be that, here, one party was influenced by
money and the other, whether intentionally or incidentally, was not.

Another important debate that has taken place over the past few years was the
fight over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, more commonly known as
Obamacare. This is an incredibly complex and notoriously long bill, and so every piece
cannot be thoroughly examined here. However, there are a few key parts of the bill that
were debated, including whether or not to allow for a public option, an individual
mandate, or an institution of tort reform.

Each of these has different relationships to sources of campaign funding in
America, A public option is by its very nature controversial to American businesses,
particularly health insurance companies. The public option is, essentially, a health
insurance company that is owned and operated by the government The idea was that, as
President Obama put it in his Sept. 9, 2009 speech on health care reform:

the public insurance option would have to be self-sufficient and rely on the
premiums it collects. But by avoiding some of the overhead that gets eaten up at
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private companies by profits and excessive administrative costs and executive
salaries, it could provide a good deal for consumers, and would also keep pressure
on private insurers to keep their policies affordable and treat their customers
better, the same way public colleges and universities provide additional choice
and competition to students without in any way inhibiting a vibrant system of
32

private colleges and universities.

In other words, the benefits that the government-run company has from being run without
a concern for profit would be used to force private companies to compete. The merits and
problems of such legislation are irrelevant here. No matter how effective this move would
be, as President Obama pointed out the cost-cutting measures that insurance companies
would need to implement would drastically affect profits, particularly for those at the top
of the corporate ladder. These same people, obviously, are the ones that would decide
how funds, including donations to electoral candidates, are allocated. Moreover, a
government-run business with no need for a profit margin could potentially mn its
competitors out of business, something that insurance companies would want to avoid at
all costs for obvious reasons.

There was an extensive push in 2009 on the lobbying end for what was seen as
more corporate-friendly legislation. Even at the time there were reports of a lobbying
“bonanza” in Washington D.C., with a historically high amount of money being spent on
lobbying efforts for Senators and Representatives.'^'^ However, on the electoral side, the
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politicians that were the target of this lobbying would have already had their electoral
help provided in 2008, at that time the most recent federal elections.

In an examination of the funding numbers one can clearly see a spike in the
amount of money donated to candidates and parties. In 2006 health-related interests
reported a total of $ 106.437.002 in campaign contributions; by 2008 this number
skyrocketed to S176,986.713. later lowering to $145,112,311 in 2010.” It is likely that
these businesses, anticipating a discussion of healthcare reform,saw fit to increase their
donations to candidates.

While it has been previously mentioned that businesses find it worthwhile to fiind
candidates, it bears repeating that this alone in no way proves that donations influence
votes. However, looking at a number of key votes can certainly enhance the picture. One
of the most important Senators on the public option debate was Ben Nelson. Nelson
famously threatened to stand alongside the Republican Party’s veto of the bill, even after
the public option was removed, and was eventually appeased through an exemption
related to Nebraska’s Medicaid costs; at the time this was derisively known at the time as
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the “Cornhusker Kickback.”

Nelson's last election was in 2006, but between 2007 and

2011 he raised almost 4.5 million dollars in contributions, money which presumably is
being or has been transferred to the DSCC.

Quite a significant amount of this money came from sources related to the health
industry: his two biggest donors between the years of 2007 and 2011 were Amgen and
Express Scripts, both very large companies specializing in pharmaceutical services.
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Further down the list the types of donors become more diversified, however there is still a
prominent showing from the health industries. What this means is that, if it is tme that
Nelson supported efforts to craft a bill more amenable to business interests, it is highly
possible that he was inlluenced by donations from those same companies.

What separates Nelson from other Senators and Representatives acting the same
way is twofold: one is that he was the most prominent Senator at the time to oppose
passage of a public option, as none of the Republicans showed a willingness to bend on
the issue. Second and more importantly is that Nelson did not run for re-election in 2012
and therefore had no reason to need campaign contributions after 2006. This makes any
hypothesis that politicians make decisions in order to court future donations impossible
by definition. Nelson had no intere.st in further elections, and therefore there are only the
possibilities that he was influenced by donations regardless of future elections, or that he
was not influenced by donations at all.

There is more than enough evidence to suggest that Nelson was influenced by the
donations given to him. He made statements and choices that by and large were highly
favorable to the very interests that were given his campaign money. Ezra Klein wrote for
the Washington Post that “a handful of conservative Democrats, led by Sen. Ben Nelson
of Nebraska, made clear that if there was a public option, they would filibuster the final
bill. And so it died” despite polls indicating that the majority of Americans were in
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support of one. The public option, of course, would be detrimental to pharmaceutical
industries that would then have to negotiate with publicly-owned business,just like with
Medicare today.
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In my mind ihc most likely explanation is this: Nelson, pressured by both the
businesses still giving him contributions and the Democratic leadership, who wanted
Nelson to continue accruing contributions for (ultimately) the DSCC,‘took the bullet,’ so
to speak and made himself a martyr for the sake of his contributors and his fellow
Congressmen. Whether or not this pressure came from Democratic leadership or from
donors, nevertheless, is irrelevant. What matters is that Nelson’s vote was influenced by
the flow of money that was coming into his campaign committee, and this ultimately led
to the Senate choosing to abandon the public option as a part of the final healthcare bill.

The one controversial measure of the bill that was actually worked into the final
version was the individual mandate. The individual mandate essentially establishes a
legal obligation for citizens to have significant health insurance coverage whether it be
through employment or direct payment. Citizens and businesses face a considerable tax
penalty for not conforming to this obligation; however there are government subsidies
available for those that are unable to pay for private insurance. The interesting part about
the individual mandate is that it was a fairly noncontroversial part of President Clinton’s
propo.sed healthcare bill in 1993, actually originating from conservative think-tanks and
Republican politics.

One would expect, then, that Republicans would by-and-large support the
measure, but nothing could be further from the truth. Republican politicians derided
Obama’s proposal as unconstitutional, but this reversal of Republican policy is difficult
to explain, other than by arguing that the GOP felt a need to oppose every part of
Obama’s proposal by any means. Taking the perspective that money influenced the
Republican Party's behavior on this issue is difficult in light of the direction of the
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switch; that is, dropping support for the individual mandate seems to be a move that risks
alienating Republican Parly donors.

That leaves the Democratic Party and whether or not their embrace of the
individual mandate was triggered by campaign contributions. However,this question
cannot be answered because the Democratic Party as a whole actually supported an
individual mandate since the introduction of Clinton's bill. It seems odd that the
Republican Parly would switch positions and the other party would not, but the reasons
for this are beyond the scope of this paper.

The final major part of health care reform to be debated was tort reform, which
was to be constructed in a way as to establish limits on punitive damages. Generally
speaking, the intent of such legislation would be to reduce the amount of money that the
healthcare industry would have to raise for legal disputes, presumably lowering the cost
to the consumer. Moreover, it would reduce the healthcare industry’s incentive to practice
defensive medicine, that is, practices that are focused on reducing liability rather than
serving patients.

The question of whether healthcare companies would favor tort reform is fairly
self-evident, however it should be noted that any form of healthcare-related tort reform
would help all industries in the field. More money that hospitals are able to save means
more money that hospitals are able to spend on things like pharmaceutical products and
medical equipment. This would clearly be something that the entirety of healthcare
business lobbyists would want, and presumably one of the things that they would want in
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exchange tor contribuiions is significant tort reform. However, no tort reform managed to
make its wav into the final hill.

Unlike the Jefeai of the public option, this was an issue in which the healthcare
industry did not sec its interests met. W hile there was something of a debate in that this
was a cornerstone of the Republican alternative to President Obama's policy, it was never
incorporated into any version of the Democratic bill. This is odd considering that
members of the Democratic Party receive large donations from industries that would
benefit from such a measure. However, it is interesting to note that lawyers and law firms
are traditionally bastions of Democratic support, the vast majority of which would lose a
significant amount of income from passage of tort reform.

I believe that this may also be explained by a strategy by the Democratic Party to
strategically choose to deny funding to medical businesses, the majority of which use
their money to fund Republican candidates. The corporations that are hurt by current tort
law in the medical field donate primarily to Republican candidates, and if the Democratic
Parly chooses to not support tort reform it may lead to a decrease in the amount of money
that Republican candidates receive from medical interests.

Assuming politicians are most prominently concerned with re-election, this theory
fits perfectly with the numerous discrepancies of behavior found in both individual
officials and Congress as a whole: perhaps a politician, in addition to courting donations
his or her self, may choose to (on the behest of the party or on individual initiative) vote
on a bill ba.sed on the ultimate benefit that this bill would have to an opponent’s coffers.
This may make some narratives somewhat more understandable in light of their effects
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on campaign funding. Fi^r instance, the minimum wage debate incorporates notjust a
‘defensive* view ai' funding, but an ‘offensive* one on the part of the Democrats:
Republicans wanted to see the status quo because the status quo hurts Democrats
(Democrats generally being recipients of more individual donations than Republicans),
not Just because the status quo benefits them more. Perhaps study should not just be
limited to parties courting donations themselves, but actively denying measures for
groups that donate to the other party. At this point, however, there is little work done in
the way of showing how parties deny resources to one another.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
There is a popular ctMisensiis in America lhai the link between moneyed interests
is bound so tightly that ptdiiicians regularly forsake their geographic constituents'
interests for lobbyists and domns. There is certainly evidence to support this claim. The
men and women of ilie Supercommittee all had different relationships to donors that were
elucidated in their statements and lines of questioning. Members like Jeb Hensarling
certainly had ideological interests to push during the hearings, but these views were more
or less in line with the expression of his donors' intere.sts. The older members, such as
John Kerry, were more technocratic in their approach, relying on more of a factual
analysis rather than ideological or self-interested stances. The youngest members were
well divided between those that seemed to defend their donors and those who seemed to
disregard them.

What this may show is that a member's seniority may be the strongest variable to
consider when analyzing his or her w illingness to form stances based on campaign
funding. Older members, typically safer in their seats and, in the case of the Senate,
having fewer

elections, feel confident enough to disregard the interests of those who finance their
campaigns. Younger members, on the other hand, are the complete opposite. They tend to
.seek shelter in the ideology of their most powerful donors, either because they feel as if
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they require funding or have simply not had the time to yet develop an ideology of their
own.

When discussing matters that reach the floors of Congress themselves, matters
become far more complex. Senators and Representatives become far more open to
negotiating with other members, influencing their decision-making greatly. Members like
Ben Nelson in the healthcare debate may make decisions that are deeply tied to financial
considerations, though this may be due to pressure from party leadership rather than the
prospect of receiving the money itself. However, on the issue of raising the minimum
wage the differences in party become stark: the Republican Party, being somewhat more
dependent on donations from business sources than the Democrats, steadfastly refused to
even consider any raise in the minimum wage, while the Democratic Party, while still
largely reliant on businesses for funding, have tinkered with the idea as a way to appeal
to the moneyed labor interests.

While one may be unable to ascertain exactly how, or even if, money influences
members’ votes, it can certainly be said that one can use the flow of money to predict the
general outcome of a particular issue. Moneyed interests being in favor of a particular
bill, it seems, is a good indicator for whether or not that bill will become law. For
instance, donors were on the whole against raising the minimum wage, and so a wage
hike (at least up to the time of this paper) has largely left the political discourse since
Obama’s State of the Union mention. In another case insurance interests and lobbyists
were instrumental in ensuring that the individual mandate was included in the healthcare
bill, while any form of public option was strongly rejected.
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In writing this paper I hoped to analyze the relationship between Congress and
special interests in a way that is both accessible and informative by examining the
individual members of the Supercommittee as a sort of microcosm for the behavior of
Congress as a whole, and then taking a step back and looking at a few other recent
debates and how they were impacted by the influence of donors and lobbyists. Though
we are a long way from understanding the way that public and private interests intersect,
I hope that this paper may inspire some to work further towards that objective. I believe
that further study would be greatly aided by adapting a more qualitative approach to
explain what is ultimately a larger quantitative phenomenon. Only by looking at and
closely examining public officials one-by-one can we hope to understand how their
decisions play a role in the greater mechanisms of Congress.
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